Brief Historical Background of American Term Limits Theory
“The debate over term limits and ‘rotation’ of candidates has continued since the founding of the republic.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 812 (1995). Thomas Jefferson insisted on a limitation of tenure in office due to the, “danger which might arise to American freedom by continuing too long in office the members of the Continental Congress….”.1 Term-limits were part of Articles of Confederation (1781-1789]), which provided one six-year term for their President and Vice-President, and barred the President from seeking re-election, and “no person shall be capable of being a delegate [to the continental congress] for more than three years in any term of six years.” The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 set tenure limits at “four years in seven.” as proposed by Ben Franklin. 2 The executive council was twelve citizens elected for the term of three years, followed by a mandatory vacation of four years. The Delaware Constitution (1776), set a single three-year term limit for governor. The federal constitutional convention omitted mandatory term-limits from the US Constitution. The principle of rotation was considered a custom well established and respected by informal rules of propriety, not requiring legal restrictions. President Washington established a two-term tradition that prevailed until Franklin Roosevelt’s four elections inspired the 22nd Amendment in 1951, the limit on tenure of presidents. Thomas Jefferson advised the necessity of term limits in the Constitution.3 Mason claimed “nothing is so essential to the preservation of a Republican government as a periodic rotation.” 4 Mercy Otis Warren complained “there is no provision for a rotation, nor anything to prevent the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life; which by a little well timed bribery, will probably be done….”5 Richard Henry Lee viewed the absence of legal limits to tenure as “most highly and dangerously oligarchic.”6 Gorrell v. Bier, 15 W.Va. 311 (1879) interpreted a term limits law limiting a sheriff to two consecutive terms, “…the probable object of which was to prevent him from prostituting the office for the purposes of a re-election.”
The fact that “perpetuity in office” did not replace the custom of “rotation in office” until the 20th century is due in part to the influence of rotation in office as a popular 19th century principle of statesmanship. “Ideas are, in truth, forces,” and rotation in office enjoyed such normative support, especially at the local level, that it altered political reality.7 Mistrust upon political power was such a part of American mainstream thought that even politicians were skeptical of their own careers. In practice, Jacksonian era politicians made the best of rotation by using an honorary award of a US Senate seat as a reward for partisan loyalty. The practice of nomination rotation for the House of Representatives began to decline after the Civil War. It took a generation or so before the direct primary system, civil service reforms, and careerism eliminated rotation in office as a common political practice. By the turn of the 20th century the era of incumbency in congress was well developed. By 1950 an incumbent class had matured and congressional tenure was almost like that of the U.S. Supreme Court life tenure; reelection rates approached 100% by the time the term limits initiatives began in 1990. By its stated purpose, “term limitations are deemed necessary to restore ‘free, fair, and competitive elections,’ to ‘encourage qualified candidates to seek public office,’ and to eliminate ‘unfair incumbent advantages’ that have resulted in an ‘extremely high number of incumbents’ and created ‘a class of career politicians’ instead of the “citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers.”, said the Californian Supreme Court in Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991) “…such limits may provide for the infusion of fresh ideas and new perspectives, and may decrease the likelihood that representatives will lose touch with their constituents.”
The Awesome Advantage Incumbency
During the 1994 Republican Revolution, one of the worst years ever for incumbent candidates, the national average reelection rate for incumbents seeking reelection was still 92% for state senators and 90% for state representatives. 100% of incumbents won their senate races in 9 states.8 Michigan incumbents enjoyed a 97% reelection rate in the decades before term limits.9 These are not natural reelection rates by anyone’s standards, but reflect awesome advantage of incumbency. League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 965 F. Supp. 96 (D. e. 1997) commented that in the 12 years prior to 1993, the year the Act was passed, almost 99% of the incumbent legislators running for re-election in the primary elections won their races, and over 92% held their seats in the general elections, and the court said “…a number of state courts have also concluded that incumbents enjoy an advantage over challengers. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349, 359-360 (1994), aff’d,514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995); Legislature of the State of California v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309, 1322-1329 (1991), cert. denied,503 U.S. 919, 112 S.Ct. 1292, 117 L.Ed.2d 516 (1992); State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607, 611-613 (1976), appeal dismissed,425 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 1689, 48 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976).” Causes of the incumbency advantage are many. An incumbent by definition is an experienced and proven campaigner. Franking privilege allows congresspersons and state legislators to send mail to their constituents at taxpayer expense, while challengers spend scarce “hard money” on mailed advertisements. Earned media inures to the benefit of incumbents; local media like covering officeholders, and know that the right coverage will get them desired access when they need it. Further, they have state paid staff to create media releases and manage promotional events. Public Service Announcements use the celebrity of politicians to make positive points, and vice versa. Legislators are credited with bringing government spending into their local areas to benefit the district. Naturally challengers can’t do this, and are often relegated to the role of naysayer. “Constituent services” allow legislators to use their office to unofficially exert influence on other branches and levels of government or the private sector, which is an easy, non-controversial way of generating goodwill by making voters happy, and happy people tell their friends. Legislative staff members do the casework. The incumbents have an enhanced ability to raise campaign money, compared to challengers, because incumbents are already in the legislature, with a vote on legislation and in committee, and oversight influence over regulators, contracts, and procurement awards. Legislators have plenty of influence to peddle. Special interest groups and their lobbyists, from government contractors to regulated industries and labor organizations, have a vested interest in the access and “special relationships” that a legislator’s appreciation of organized campaign donations can foster. Challengers, on the other hand, are neither a known quantity nor a good risk, given the stacked odds and the fear of retribution that comes from the fact that the one single thing that feckless campaign finance laws, enacted by incumbents for their own mutual benefit, really accomplish is to insure is that the incumbent will find out, through campaign finance disclosure reports, exactly who donated to his challenger. Whatever the causes, it is the nature of incumbency that the incumbent can use the power and prestige of his public trust to influence the result of his own reelection campaign in devastating ways, and it is the nature of human ambition that he will aggressively do so. Term limits are not designed to directly eliminate the advantage of incumbency, because ambition knows no bounds and because the factors that combine to make the incumbent so likely to win reelection are literally inherent in the holding of political office. Rather, limits on an incumbent’s tenure in office are designed to promote rotation in office by insuring regular, periodic open competitive elections.
Term Limits Initiatives: Basic Characteristics and Variations
No term limits in America are longer than Nevada’s Term Limits of 12 years in each chamber, and none took this long to take effect. 21 states have passed Term Limits laws since 1990. Legislative Term Limits are in effect in 15 states, while 6 states have eliminated term limits by court or legislative action. Voters have never overturned term limits in any state, although state legislatures have proposed 4 unsuccessful ballot questions, and the South Dakota legislature has a pending ballot question proposal to repeal Term Limits on themselves. No State of Federal court has ever struck any State term limits law on substantive grounds. Only one state court, Oregon, has struck an initiative constitutional amendment imposing term limits on “single subject” procedural grounds not applicable to the Nevada elections. By contrast, 39 states have Term Limits on their governors, justified in Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607 W.Va. 1976. “The power of incumbent officeholders to develop networks of patronage and attendant capacities to deliver favorably disposed voters to the polls,” “fears of an entrenched political machine which could effectively foreclose access to the political process,” and the belief that regularly disrupting those “machines” “would stimulate criticism within political parties” and “insure a meaningful, adversary, and competitive election.”
State Legislative Term Limits have two basic classifications: Lifetime limits on tenure and limits on consecutive terms in the same office. Consecutive term limits break the cycle of virtually inevitable incumbent reelection after eight years, but don’t prevent any person from moving indefinitely between chambers of the state legislature (except in Nebraska, where there is a unicameral legislature). Neither method prevents an officeholder from remaining indefinitely in elective government office.
Six states, including Nevada, have lifetime tenure limits: Arkansas, California, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Nevada have lifetime bans. Arkansas, California, and Michigan limit a person to 6 years in the House of Representatives and 8 years in the Senate. Missouri allows 8 years in each chamber. Oklahoma allows a person 12 total years, served in one chamber or the other, or any combination of the two. The Louisiana legislature passed a lifetime limit of 12 years in each house. Nevada’s modest Constitutional Amendment would limit legislators to 12 years in any one chamber.
Nine states have bans on consecutive terms: Nebraska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Montana, Ohio, South Dakota, and Louisiana. In Ohio and Colorado, State lawmakers in each chamber must take a 4 year timeout after 8 consecutive years, and in Montana a lawmaker may only serve 8 years in one chamber during each 16 year span. Unicameral Nebraska has a ban on over 8 consecutive years. Arizona, Florida, Maine, and South Dakota limit legislators to 8 consecutive years in each chamber.
Unilateral State-imposed Limits on Congresspersons
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (93-1456), 514 U.S. 779 (1995) invalidated all state laws purporting to set disqualifications for US Congressmen on the federalism grounds; the federal constitution set the qualifications for the US Congress10. States have no authority to change, add to, or diminish the requirements for congressional service enumerated in the Qualifications Clauses; “..the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for members of Congress, and that the Framers thereby “divested” States of any power to add qualifications.” Thornton does not relate to state imposed limits on the terms of state and local elected officials, and so has no bearing whatsoever on the contested validity of Nevada Term Limits, except where it acknowledges the right of the people to impose term limits on State and local officers free of federal interference. The court said, “Over half the States have adopted measures that impose such limits on some offices either directly or indirectly, and the Nation as a whole, notably by constitutional amendment, has imposed a limit on the number of terms that the President may serve. Term limits, like any other qualification for office, unquestionably restrict the ability of voters to vote for whom they wish. On the other hand, such limits may provide for the infusion of fresh ideas and new perspectives, and may decrease the likelihood that representatives will lose touch with their constituents. It is not our province to resolve this longstanding debate.” See also Thorsted v. Munro, 75 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1996). A state’s ballot access statutes with term limits for the United States Senate and House of Representatives violated the qualifications clauses and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for, even if the statutes were viewed as an attempt to regulate the electoral process, the statutes would have the practical effect of imposing a new qualification of nonincumbency beyond specified periods.
Local Term Limits
In Colorado, Nevada, Nebraska, and Mississippi state law imposes term limits on consecutive terms for local officials; local initiatives in various states allow municipalities to impose term limits, while some states do not. In Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition v. Keefe, 535 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn. 1995), Minnesota does not have a statewide term limits law. The court found that a city charter amendment limiting terms of office for local elected officials violated the state constitution, even though the constitution allowed the legislature to provide by law for “qualifications” for office. Term limits were actually “eligibility requirements,” which were exclusively fixed by the constitution as a state constitutional guarantee of universal eligibility for public office. The court pointed out that a critical distinction exists between a “qualification” for office and an “eligibility requirement” for office. The court added that a qualification is an element of performance requiring a particular ability on the part of the person seeking the position, such as physical agility or the attainment of a particular level of education.
Eligibility requirements, on the other hand have nothing to do with one’s ability to perform the duties of the office in question, and include the age and residency requirements. This case is inapplicable to Nevada, where local term limits are set by constitution. In Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 937 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Tex. 1996), a term limits initiative did not violate a council member’s rights of equal protection. Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1212, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179 (2d Dist. 1993), as modified, (June 1, 1993) upheld a municipal ordinance imposing term limits on council members did not violate freedom of speech or equal protection rights of a disqualified councilperson under the state or federal constitution, for injury was limited since the disqualified councilperson could still seek other types of municipal offices, and since the city had an interest in ensuring that others would be encouraged to run for office and that the existence of a class of “career politicians” should be discouraged. Roth v. Cuevas, 158 Misc. 2d 238, 603 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup 1993), judgment aff’d without opinion, 197 A.D.2d 369, 603 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep’t 1993), order aff’d without opinion, 82 N.Y.2d 791, 604 N.Y.S.2d 551, 624 N.E.2d 689 (1993), a proposed amendment to the New York City Charter limiting terms of office of elected city officials did not impermissibly infringe on the right to seek office under the equal protection clause of the New York Constitution. The purpose of enacting term limitations includes: (1) making elections more competitive; (2) restoring public confidence in the democratic process; (3) bringing fresh views and opinions to political office; (4) encouraging elected representatives who are citizen representatives responsive to the needs of the people and are not career politicians; and (5) providing a procedural safeguard to eliminate the multiple abuses that can come from unlimited tenure in office. Lowe v. Kansas City Bd. of Election Com’rs, 752 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mo. 1990), a case in which voters and incumbent city council members brought an action challenging a city charter amendment limiting the term of council members to eight consecutive years, the court, denying the motion, held that the charter amendment did not violate the Voting Rights Act. Polis v. City of La Palma, 10 Cal. App. 4th 25, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322 (4th Dist.1992), the power of a general city law to impose term limits on council members was preempted by a statute requiring a council member to be an elector and registered voter of the city. Town of Hooksett v. Baines, 148 N.H. 625, 813 A.2d 474 (2002) held that state and the state constitution preempted a town’s charter provision imposing term limits on locally elected officials.
Lifetime Limits on Tenure – State by State
Arkansas: Constitution limits all statewide elected officials to two four-year terms, state representatives to three two-year terms and state senators to two four-year terms. (Amendment 73) Litigation: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349, 359-360 (1994), aff’d, 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). This case later became known as US Term Limits v Thornton after US Representative Thornton joined in the case over the federal issue. State Supreme Court rule that Arkansas limits on state officers are valid, the court said, “We hold that the state interest, as expressed in the Preamble to Amendment 73, is sufficiently rational and even compelling when weighed against the residual burden placed on the rights and privileges of elected officeholders and those desiring to support them.” Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers.
California: Constitution limits state legislators to three two-year terms in the Assembly and two four-year terms in the Senate. Constitutional officers are limited to two four-year terms. (1990-Article IV, Section 2) Litigation: Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991), case that a permanent incumbency limitations proposed by a constitutional amendment were supported by legitimate and compelling considerations justifying any legal impact on voters and candidates, did not violate equal protection, and could not be characterized as a bill of attainder under either the historical, functional, and motivational tests. Term Limits applied with equal force to all state legislators, current and future, and although it sought to limit the terms of incumbent legislators, including long-term legislators, there was no evidence of any intention to single out and punish individuals for any supposed misconduct on their part, and stated, “neither voter choice nor candidate eligibility is restricted based on the content of protected expression, political affiliation, or inherently arbitrary factors such as race, religion or sex. The only criterion used is incumbency.” The court rejected the argument that term limits “…ban those who are arguably the most qualified candidates-incumbents with the experience and expertise in the legislative process necessary to the most effective representation of their constituencies.” In 1997 the Federal court reexamined California Supreme Court’s decision. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997), reaffirmed that the amendment imposed a neutral candidacy qualification, did not constitute a discriminatory restriction, and the minimal impact on the plaintiffs’ rights was justified by the state’s legitimate interest in avoiding unfair incumbent advantages. “Long-term entrenched legislators may obtain excessive power which, in turn, may discourage other qualified candidates from running for office or may provide the incumbent with an unfair advantage in winning reelection.” Term limits on state officeholders is a neutral candidacy qualification, like age or residency, which the state certainly has the right to impose; “such limits may provide for the infusion of fresh ideas and new perspectives, and may decrease the likelihood that representatives will lose touch with their constituents.”
Michigan: Constitution restricts state representatives to three terms, state senators and members of the executive branch to two terms. ( Article IV, Section 54). Litigation: Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1998), affirmed Michigan’s term limit law in the face of a challenge based upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The court summarized the legal status of Term Limits, “The relevant cases reveal two general approaches to term limits. In the more common framework, courts balance the state’s interests against the burden on voters. In the other framework, courts uphold any qualifications unless they plainly violate the Constitution.” Discussing whether consecutive term limits provides a viable alternative, the court said, “Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assurances, consecutive term limits are not a viable alternative. E.g., Eu , 816 P.2d at 1327-28. Former incumbents would still retain important advantages in name-recognition and fund-raising, such as aproven ability to win and an organizational network. Id. Legislators might adjust their conduct, and bow to special interest groups, in the hopes of someday returning to office. Id. Moreover, some incumbents could arrange for “caretakers” to hold their offices for a short period of time, and thereby repeatedly return to office after only short absences. Id. See also Nevada Judges Ass’n v. Lau , 910 P.2d 898, 902 (Nev. 1996) (noting that consecutive term limits may not achieve the desired rate of turnover).” The court pointed out that, “A State need not justify its laws with “elaborate, empirical verification.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 117 S.Ct. 1364, 1372 (1997) (upholding ballot limits despite lack of proven need).” Term limits do not create a ballot access issue, but prescribe qualifications for state office that do not clearly violate the federal constitution, whether analyzed under a balancing test or by giving deference to the state’s right to decide how to structure its own government. A person does not have a fundamental right to vote for whomever they choose whenever they choose (see: Zielasko v Ohio, 873 F. 2nd 957), and so the standard of review is the rational basis test. Many valid laws set maximum and minimum age qualifications, which are content neutral. US Supreme Court in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 433, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 119 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1992): Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters. Each provision of a code, ‘whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects–at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.’ Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569-1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Consequently, to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”The court pointed out the overwhelming number of judges who have voted to uphold term limits in previous cases, the court further noting that lifetime term limits, the type of limits presented in the instant case, impose a neutral burden, not a content-based burden. The amendment burdened no voters based on the content of protected expression, party affiliation, or inherently arbitrary factors such as race, religion, or gender, and burdened no voters based on their views on any of the substantive “issues of the day,” such as taxes or abortion.
Missouri: Constitution limits state legislators to eight years per chamber and 16 years total. (Article 3, Section 8). Litigation: Cook V. Gralike (99-929) 531 U.S. 510 (2001) 191 F.3d 911, affirmed invalidated state Scarlet letter laws that placed notations regarding a candidate’s commitment to or against term limits, similar to the scarlet letter laws that were used in the early 20th century to push women’s suffrage and popular election of US senators. These cases also had nothing to do with term limits on state officers, and so has no bearing whatsoever on the validity of Nevada Term Limits.
Nevada: Constitution would restrict members of the Assembly 12 years or 6 terms and Senators to three terms or 12 years. Secretary of state, state treasurer, state comptroller and attorney general would be limited to eight years or two terms. Governor is limited to two consecutive terms. ( Article 4, Sections 3 and 4; Article 5, Section 19; Article 15, Section 3) Litigation: Nevada Judges Ass’n v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 910 P.2d 898 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed a term limit initiative under a constitutional scheme whereby the initiative could be used directly to amend the constitution. The court rejected due process and equal protection arguments, finding the initiative constitutional against a “barrier to ballot access” challenge, the court held that the right to seek office is not a fundamental right, that the higher level of judicial review of strict scrutiny did not therefore apply, and that states have important election regulation interests.
Oklahoma: Constitution limits state legislators to 12 years combined total. (1990-Article 5, Section 17-A)
Limits on Consecutive Terms – State by State
Arizona: Constitution amendment limits legislators to four consecutive two-year terms and members of the executive branch to two consecutive four-year terms. (Article IV, Part 2, Section 21)
Colorado: Constitutional amendment limits state legislators to four consecutive two-year terms in the House and two consecutive four-year terms in the Senate. (1991-Article V, Section 3) Litigation: Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648 Colo.,2004. “In consideration of the importance of implementing the intent of the voters who initiated the amendment unless such implementation is impossible”, the court ordered local term lmits elections be facilitated regardless of county jurisdictional problems, “any other holding would exalt form over substance, and would frustrate not only the intent of the voters of the Tenth Judicial District regarding the measure before us today, but also the intent of the people of Colorado in enacting section 11. The people of Colorado clearly intended to reserve the power to lengthen, shorten, or eliminate term limits for all officials covered under section 11(1), without the need for further legislative action.”
Florida: Constitutional amendment prohibits running for re-election to the Legislature if by the end of their current term they have served for eight consecutive years. (1992-Article VI, Section 4) Litigation: Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1999). Upheld term limits on elected state officials, which did not violate the candidates’ equal protection rights; the electorate’s interest in limiting terms outweighed the interests of the candidates for re-election and the voters who wished to vote for those particular candidates.
Montana: Constitutional amendment limits state senators, state representatives and state officials to eight years in any 16-year period, respectively. (Article IV, Section 8) Litigation: Cole v. State ex rel. Brown 308 Mont. 265, 42 P.3d 760 Mont., 2002. Supreme Court applied latches and refused to consider in 2002 a procedural challenge to Term Limits amendment, which was enacted in 1992. “…if we allowed Plaintiffs to challenge the procedure by which CI-64 was enacted nine years after the fact, what would prevent a party from filing a similar procedural challenge to some other constitutional initiative fifteen, twenty or even thirty years after that initiative’s enactment? There must be a point at which a claim asserting that Montana voters failed to follow the proper procedures in enacting a constitutional initiative simply comes too late. We have reached that point.”. The court rejected Plaintiffs claim that the doctrine of laches was inapplicable here because a ripe case or controversy did not exist until the fall of 2001 when Cole and Christiaens each decided to seek re-election for a third term. “ The controversy here was neither “hypothetical” nor “speculative” prior to Cole and Christiaens’ decisions in the fall of 2001 to seek re-election for a third term. If the process by which CI-64 was enacted is invalid as Plaintiffs claim, then it was invalid in November 1992 when the initiative was enacted and the case or controversy was ripe at that time.
Nebraska: Constitutional amendment restricts state legislators to two consecutive terms in the unicameral legislature. (C – Article III, Section 12). Litigation: Nebraska Supreme Court, in Duggan v. Beerman, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68, 71-79 (1996), rejected that state’s term limit initiative. Based on the fact that that the United States Supreme Court (Thornton) held in 1995 that state-imposed term limits on congressional offices were unconstitutional, the court found that the portion of the initiative relating to those congressional offices was “so interwoven” with the portion of the initiative relating to term limits for state offices that the entire initiative had to fail. This issue does not apply to Nevada, as these questions were separate. The measure was resubmitted and passed by the voters. State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale 734 N.W.2d 290, 300+, 273 Neb. 889, 898+ (Neb. Jul 06, 2007) – upheld new State Term Limits amendment in Nebraska. Appellants have failed to show that Nebraska’s term limit amendment imposes a severe burden on their First Amendment rights or that it violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Ohio: Constitutional amendment restricts state senators to two consecutive terms and state representatives to four consecutive terms. Limits the executive branch to two consecutive terms. Terms are considered consecutive unless there is a break of four years. (1990-Article II, Section 2)
South Dakota: Constitutional amendment restricts limits state lawmakers to four consecutive two-year terms in each house and statewide officers to two consecutive terms. (Article III, Section 6)
Maine: Statute limits state legislators and constitutional officers to four consecutive two-year terms in each body. State auditor is limited to two consecutive four-year terms. (ME ST T. 21-A, Section 553) Litigation: League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 965 F. Supp. 96 (D. Me. 1997) upheld Maine’s Term Limits law, and confirmed, “Despite the fact that over half the states have gubernatorial term limits and over one-third have enacted term limits on state legislators, no court has overturned term limits on state officers under First and Fourteenth Amendment challenge.” “Defendants offered six interests served by the term limits imposed under the Act: first, to reduce unfair advantage of incumbents at the polls; second, to promote fairer and more competitive elections; third, to encourage qualified new candidates to run for office; fourth, to dislodge entrenched political leadership; fifth, to curb the power of political machines; and sixth, to encourage service by citizen representatives, rather than career politicians.” Sufficient evidence was presented regarding the extremely high reelection rates of incumbent law makers created by the power of public office, name recognition, and other factors, to support the significant advantage of incumbents over challengers. Evidence was presented regarding the extremely high re-election rates of incumbent law makers created by the power of public office, like name recognition, which demonstrate the significant advantage of incumbents over challengers. The recent history of Maine’s state elections clearly demonstrated the power of incumbency, and an affidavit submitted to the court by the Director of Corporations and Elections for the Maine Secretary of State’s Office, documented the resilience of Maine’s incumbent law makers, the court remarked. In the 12 years prior to 1993, the year the Act was passed, almost 99% of the incumbent legislators running for re-election in the primary elections won their races, and over 92% held their seats in the general elections. The court also said “There are numerous examples of cases where more significant restrictions have been upheld as constitutional. In Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958, 95 S.Ct. 1346, 43 L.Ed.2d 435 (1975), aff’g,383 F.Supp. 1287 (D.N.H.1974), for example, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision that a seven year residency requirement for state senators was constitutional.”
Louisiana: Statute passed by legislature limits House and Senate members to three consecutive four-year terms. (Article III, Section 4-E).
Statutory Term Limits Repealed by State Legislatures
Idaho: State legislators and statewide-elected officials were limited to eight years in a 15 year period. ( ID ST 34-907) Litigation: Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560, 38 P.3d 598 (2001), held that the statutes in question do not violate the Idaho Constitution or the United States Constitution. The Idaho Legislature thereafter repealed term limits in February 2002.
Utah: Denied state officers and members of the House and Senate from ballot access after more than 12 consecutive years in office. (S – UCA 20A-10-201) The Utah Legislature repealed the term limits law in March 2003.
Statutory Term Limits Invalidated by State Supreme Courts
Washington: Statute limited state senators to eight of 14 years, representatives to six out of 12 years, and governor/lt. governor to eight of 14 years. (2002 – RC WA Section 44.04.015) Litigation: Washington Supreme Court voided the term limits statute. Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366, 1370-74 (1998): the initiative statute is reflective of the reserved power of the people to legislate, but the people in their legislative capacity still are subject to constitutional mandates but constitutional qualifications are exclusive, and non-incumbency characteristics constitute a qualification for office.
Wyoming: Statute limited state senators to three terms in any 24-year period, representatives to six terms in any 24-year period, and other constitutional officers to two terms in any 16-year period. (1992 Statute – WSA Section 22-5-103) Litigation: Wyoming Supreme Court invalidated legislative term limits. Cathart v. Meyer 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050. The reserved powers of the people under the Wyoming Constitution do not include the right to alter the government by initiative legislation or by statute with regard to the time period any one person can hold a state legislative office because the unambiguous and exclusive provisions of the state Constitution establish eligibility requirements for state legislature.
Massachusetts: Initiative Statute limited governor, lt. governor, secretary, treasurer, auditor or attorney general to two consecutive terms within an 11-year period. Limited state senators and representatives to four consecutive terms in nine years. (S – MGLA Chapter 53, Section 48) Litigation: Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 413 Mass. 1201, 595 N.E.2d 292 (1992) An initiative petition to limit the terms of both state and federal officer holders, including governor, lieutenant governor, United States senator, and representatives in Congress, was not inconsistent with the freedom of elections provision of the Declaration of Rights under the Massachusetts Constitution. League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Secretary of Com., 425 Mass. 424, 681 N.E.2d 842 (1997) found term limits statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held as follows: (1) the legislature may not change qualifications for public office that are prescribed by the state constitution; (2) term limits are not mere election regulations, but are qualifications for holding office; (3) the initiative may not be used to accomplish what the legislature cannot accomplish; and (4) “[t]he idea that constitutionally prescribed qualifications may be changed only by constitutional amendment is intuitively sound.”
Alaska: People voted on Congressional Term Limits initiative Statute only. Litigation: In Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960, 961-64 (Alaska 1994), the Alaska Supreme Court found a legislative term limit initiative unconstitutional for several reasons, including: (1) when the conflicting principles of constitutional government and the people’s right to express their will conflict, the former must prevail; (2) the US Constitution’s constitutional qualifications are exclusive even though not explicitly so; (3) and office-holding qualifications are not mere election regulations. Alaska Constitution legislative initiative would set the qualifications for legislative office and term limits are not included in those qualifications, therefore legislative initiative cannot impose term limits. Alaska has no constitutional initiative process, and ballot question to impose statute was not held.
Term Limits Constitutional Amendment Repealed by State Court
Oregon: Constitutional amendment limited state lawmakers to six years in the House and eight years in the Senate or no more than 12 years of legislative service. Statewide officeholders were limited to eight years. (C – Article II, Section 19) Litigation: In Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 231, 37 P.3d 989 (2002), a term limit initiative was found unconstitutional because the provisions establishing term limits for state elective offices were not closely related to the provisions establishing term limits for federal congressional offices, which violated a constitutional mandate that voters be able to vote separately on independent issues.
A Program of All-inclusive Care for the Elderly Keeps Seniors out of Nursing Homes
HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF “PAY-TO-PLAY” CAMPAIGN FINANCE RESTRICTIONS IN AMERICA
